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Abstract
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and
ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another
potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good provision
games. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving at the cost of
reducing their own monetary payoff. In the one-sided treatment this is only possible for
one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both
cases decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain
by gift giving. The overall conclusion from our results is that striving for efficiency is
constrained by equity concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in one-
sided gift-relationships.
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21. Introduction
In dictator experiments two parties, X and Y, can share a monetary pie p of fixed size. X,
the “dictator”, makes the only decision x, with px ≤≤0 , of the underlying “dictator
game” and thereby allocates monetary payoffs p − x to X and x to Y, the “recipient”.1
Neglecting other regarding preferences (see on utility interdependencies the classification
in Ng, 1979, chap. 1) X can, in principle, consider two dimensions of value, his own
payoff p − x and the fairness of the payoff vector (p − x, x). Depending on the size of x
the two considerations will be either in harmony or conflict. If X regards more egalitarian
distributions as more fair than less egalitarian ones then every choice of x from the
interval (p/2, p] is strictly dominated along both the personal gain and the fairness
dimension in this range by x = p/2. Over the range (0, p/2), on the other hand, any change
in x either increases X’s personal gain at the expense of rendering the distribution less
egalitarian or the fairness of the distribution is increased at the expense of a decreasing
payoff p – x for X.2
While in dictator experiments any final allocation is efficient, dictator dilemma
experiments, as first introduced by Ockenfels (1999), create a sharp trade-off between
fairness and efficiency. More specifically, in dictator dilemma games Y receives more
than what X gives. Let e (> 0) denote X’s monetary endowment. The choice x with
ex ≤≤0  allocates the monetary payoff e – x to X and the payoff mx, m > 1, to Y. The
larger x the larger the payoff sum e + (m − 1) x. A dictator X who places positive value
on the total payoff has good reason to consider also choices x in the range x > p/2.
Therefore in the dictator dilemma, contrary to the dictator experiment, even over the
range x > e/(m + 1) in which fairness could be increased by a reduction of x such a
reduction of x is not necessarily the only plausible choice. Since in addition dictator
dilemma games do not create incentives for strategically motivated other-regarding
                                                          
1 Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998) study various experimental dictator games and review earlier dictator
game studies in experimental economics. Related experiments were performed by social psychologists who
first let participants work and then allocate their common reward p knowing X’s contribution to p; see, for
instance, Shapiro (1975), and for a more recent study with entitlements by experimental economists
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985).
3behavior, they are an appropriate tool to measure the relative impact of fairness and
efficiency considerations.
The experiment whose result we describe and discuss subsequently combines aspects
of the dictator and the dictator dilemma game. Like in the dictator game the player who
has to make an actual decision can unilaterally allocate monetary amounts to himself and
a recipient. What X gives to Y is either doubled, i.e. m = 2, or just passed on, i.e. m = 1.
Doubling occurs with probability 5/6 while the monetary amount is passed on with
complementary probability of 1/6. By allowing an X-participant to condition his gift x to
Y on whether the gift is doubled (the gift 2x ) or not (the gift 1x ), we learn for every X-
participant how she would behave in a dictator experiment and in a dictator dilemma
experiment. Therefore, beyond Ockenfels (1999) “within”-subject comparisons are
possible.3
Two different treatments were used, both relying on the game sketched here.
In the one-sided treatment there are players in the dictator role and others who are
serving as recipients only. None serves in both roles. The two-sided treatment introduces
symmetry in the sense that not only X chooses 1x  for 1=xm  and 2x  for 2=xm  but that
also Y makes corresponding decisions 1y  for 1=ym  and 2y  for 2=ym . Depending on
the chance moves and their simultaneous decisions 1x  and 2x , on the one and 1y  and 2y
on the other hand, X respectively Y earn:
11 yxe +− ; 11 xye +− for 1== yx mm
12 yxe +− ; 21 2xye +− for 1,2 == yx mm
21 2yxe +− ; 12 xye +− for 2,1 == yx mm
22 2yxe +− ; 22 2xye +− for 2== yx mm
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 The theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1964) suggests that participants might tend to avoid conflict
through prioritizing either fairness, choosing x = p/2, or personal gain, choosing x = 0. In such cases the
focus would be completely on one while leaving out of account the other concern completely. While this
happens quite frequently, many other individuals are compromising their two values in the sense of
choosing an x from the range 0 < x < p/2 where fairness and self-interest conflict.
3 One could argue that contrary to what rationality implies, X-participants will consider the overall
stochastic choice problem. Since our data are in line with the results of Ockenfels (1999) who did not apply
the strategy method, this argument seems lacking importance.
4Compared to the one-sided treatment, in the two-sided treatment gift giving can be
supported by the hope that the partner will donate as well. Such expectations should lead
to larger gifts, mainly in case of m = 2 but also when m = 1. Efficiency would require
eyx == 22 . However, donating the full endowment requires trust in the other’s
willingness to act likewise if fairness is a critical consideration. The experiments provide
some insights in what may happen in such situations.
In the following section 2 we describe the experimental procedure in some detail.
Sections 3 and 4 present the results of the one-sided, respectively two-sided treatment.
Final observations in section 5 conclude the paper.
2. Experimental Procedure
The experiments have been performed at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Participants
were recruited from students attending an undergraduate course in microeconomics. 24
participants played the two-sided treatment (since both partners decide independently,
this provides 24 independent observations). In the one-sided treatment we also had 24
pairs yielding 24 independent observations for ‘dictators’ X and 24 observations for
‘recipients’ Y (who were asked for hypothetical choices: “what would you give if you
were X instead of Y?”).
Participants were urged to carefully read the instructions (the instructions are
available from the authors upon request), then they received their decision forms with
two control questions, checking whether the rules were understood, and asking for the
(hypothetical) decisions. The final question elicits in an elementary way expectations
about gift giving by others.
In the one-sided treatment three participants, one dictator and two recipients, did not
answer both control questions correctly (see individual data file in the Appendix). In the
more complex two-sided treatment also three participants (# 3, 11, and 17) failed to
understand the experiment fully. Leaving these participants in our data file would not
have questioned our principal effects. In our analysis, however, we rely exclusively on
the choices of subjects who answered the control questions correctly.
5An experimental session lasted about 30 minutes. The initial endowment was always
e = DM 10. We allowed for non-integer choices 1x  and 2x . The data file in the Appendix
lists all 72 observations (including the six that are left out in the analysis since they came
from participants who did not answer the control question correctly).
3. One-sided gift giving
The actual (hypothetical) rounded 1x  and 2x -choices by dictators (recipients) in the one-
sided treatment are graphically illustrated in Figures 1a (actual choice) and 1b
(hypothetical choices). Table 1 additionally provides summary statistics like the average
relative gift 10/11 xx
r
= , 10/22 xx
r
= , or 20/)( 21 xxx
r +=  and their respective standard
deviations (first rows). Participants’ responses to the question of what they expected as
donations are represented, too, by expectation-averages and their standard deviations
(second rows).








Figure 1a: Distribution of the donations of X in the one-sided treatment











Figure 1b: Distribution of the hypothetical donations of Y in the one sided treatment
passing on doubling both
rx1 rx1σ
rx2 rx2σ 20
21 xxxr += rxσ
chosen 27.3 16.7 17.0 9.1 22.1 12.6X
N = 23 expected 27.0 13.9 16.7 9.8 21.8 11.5
chosen 21.6 24.8 15.9 21.7 18.8 22.8Y
N = 22 expected 13.8 13.9 11.3 11.2 12.5 11.8




N = 45 expected 20.4 13.9 14.0 10.5 17.2 11.6
Table 1: Averages and standard deviations of relative donations of X and Y in the
one-sided treatment (in percent)
Without exception 51 ≤x  and 3/102 ≤x  so that no X-participant ever granted a
higher payoff to her Y-partner than to herself. This clearly confirms
7Regularity 1: In the one-sided treatment fairness concerns dominate efficiency
considerations in the sense that dictators never put themselves at a relative
disadvantage even if that be efficiency enhancing (for m = 2).
In view of Regularity 1, one can speak of a one-sided fairness constraint in the sense
of )1/( −≤ mex  which makes sure that X-dictators never get less than their Y-partner (see
also Ockenfels, 1999). This, of course, does not exclude payoff vectors yielding less to Y-
partners, i.e. allocations brought about by a choice x )1/( −< me . Actually, since the
average rx1  is 27.3 and the average 
rx22  is 34 (
rx210083 −=< ), the Y-partners earn about
1/3 of what dictators get in case of m = 1 and only a slightly higher share in case of m =
2. As revealed by Table 1 this coincides pretty well with expectations. Since the average
expectations of X-participants differ from average behavior only by 0.3% for 1x  and 2x ,
we can note
Regularity 2: Actual choices and expected choices of dictators X are nearly identical.
Regularity 2 is based on averages and therefore would not in principle exclude the
possibility that generous X-participants expect meager gifts and vice versa. This
possibility is, however, ruled out by the strong positive correlation between 1x  and 2x -
choices and their corresponding expectations for others (the highly significant Spearman
rank correlation coefficients are 0.633 for 1x  and 0.753 for 2x ). This justifies
Regularity 3: Generous donors expect generosity to prevail in general.4
The intra-personal comparison of individual 1x - and 2x -choices may provide some
clue as to what may have been motivational forces behind the observed patterns of choice
behavior. Table 2 gives a complete classification of ( 21, xx )-vectors as fixed by X-
participants, namely
                                                          
4 A similar effect has been observed by Selten and Ockenfels (1998) in the context of the solidarity game.
8• the egoistic type with 021 == xx ,
• the constant-sacrifice type with 021 >= xx ,
• the constant-gift type with 02 21 >= xx ,
• the intermediate (of the two previous) types with 02 212 >>> xxx ,
• and the efficiency-minded type with 012 ≥> xx .
egoistic fixed total
sacrifice






1x = 2x  = 0 1x = 2x  > 0 02 212 >>> xxx 02 21 >= xx 012 ≥> xx
# 2 6 3 12 0X
% 9% 26% 13% 52% 0%
# 7 5 0 9 1Y
% 32% 23% 0% 41% 5%
Table 2: Types of conditional donations of X- and Y-players in the one-sided treatment
Among the individuals assigned the dictator role X  the major categories are the
constant-gift type with 52% and the constant-sacrifice type with (26%). More than 90%
of all X-participants engaged in gift-giving, i.e. were non-egoistic. The only zero-gifts
came from the two egoistic types. No X-participant was efficiency-guided. We observe
Regularity 4: Selfish behavior in the sense of contributing zero-gifts is very rare, and is
not shown even if unselfish behavior cannot affect efficiency gains.
Table 2 also includes hypothetical choices of recipients Y who were asked to imagine
that they were in fact acting in the dictator role. It is rather surprising that Y-participants
in their imagined decision chose on average lower 1x - and 2x -values. Since Y-choices are
purely hypothetical, it would have been cheap (talk) to display generosity. Yet the
differences between the distributions of actual and hypothetical choices are insignificant
9(two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.127 and 0.186 for 1x  and 2x , respectively).
However, Y-participants expect significantly lower 1x - and 2x - gifts by others (p = 0.003
and 0.061 for 1x  and 2x , respectively) than X-participants. Expectations distinguish X-
and Y-participants according to
Regularity 5: While hypothetical gifts are only slightly smaller than payoff-relevant
gifts, recipients are substantially less optimistic about gift giving by others than
dictators.
Like actual dictators most recipients (41%) in their imagined choices as dictators are
of the constant-gift type. But the second largest group are the egoistic types (32%)
although the constant-sacrifice type is also non-negligible (23%). The efficiency-minded
type is extremely rare (just one Y-participant).
4. Mutual gift giving
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the (rounded) 1x - and 2x -choices observed in the two-
sided treatment. Due to the symmetry of mutual gift giving all participants encounter the
same decision problem. To distinguish from the asymmetric roles of X and Y in the one-
sided treatment we refer to these participants as Z-players.
Comparing Figure 2 with Figures 1a and 1b the distributions are much more spread
out:5 Neither 51 >x  nor 2x > 10/3 are excluded.
                                                          
5 The standard deviations are smallest for actual dictators, intermediate for hypothetical dictators, and
largest for mutual gift givers.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the donations in the two-sided treatment
Table 3, which corresponds to Table 1, reveals that compared to unilateral dictators
mutual gift givers choose slightly (but not significantly) lower 1x -gifts but significantly
larger 2x -gifts (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.052). Most importantly, while in
the one-sided treatment rx1  is substantially larger than 
rx2 , both among dictators and
among recipients, the opposite is true in case of mutual gift giving.
passing on doubling both
rx1 rx1σ
rx2 rx2σ 20
21 xxxr += rxσ
chosen 23.1 26.5 33.0 36.0 28.0 28.2two-
sided
Z
N = 21 expected 17.9 16.5 25.7 28.4 21.8 18.8
Table 3: Averages and standard deviations of relative donations of Z in the two-sided
treatment (in percent)
This  justifies to state the following
Regularity 6: The possibility of receiving a donation from the recipient of one’s own
donation strengthens efficiency considerations for m = 2 while leaving the proclivity
to donate unaffected in the absence of efficiency gains; i.e. if m = 1.
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Similar to Regularities 2 and 3, average expectations concerning gift giving by others
are only insignificantly below actual average choices while expectations and own choices
are highly significantly correlated (the Spearman rank correlation coefficients are 0.586
for 1x  and 0.600 for 2x ).
Table 4 applies the same classification of types as in Table 2 to the two-sided
treatment. Compared to the dictator dilemma case (52%) the constant-gift type is quite
rare (14%) in case of mutual gift giving whereas the efficiency-minded type ranges rather
prominently (23% instead of 0%).
It seems that mutual gift giving induces more extreme behavior than one-sided gift
giving. At least not only the efficiency-minded type but also the egoistic type is more
frequent in the two-sided than in the one-sided gift-relationship. The reasons for this may
be that trust and uncertainty play a much stronger role in the case of two-sided gift giving
than in case of unilateral donations. For the dictator uncertainty about the receiver is
naturally absent and therefore such uncertainty cannot provide a reason or an excuse for
non-generous behavior. In the shadow of uncertainty about the behavior of others in the
case of mutual gift giving, however, individuals may feel that they are not acting
egoistically if they do not contribute efficient amounts. What in the one-sided case would
be unfair “greed” is now “protection” against exploitation (defensio in Hobbes’
terminology of the De Cive, see also the English translation 1998).
egoistic fixed total
sacrifice






1x = 2x  = 0 1x = 2x  > 0 02 212 >>> xxx 02 21 >= xx 012 ≥> xx
# 7 4 1 3 6Z
% 33% 19% 5% 14% 29%
Table 2: Types of conditional donations in the two-sided treatment
The fact that in the one-sided treatment recipients in their imaginary role as dictators
are less generous than actual dictators, supports the view that the lack of generosity in the
12
two-sided treatment may be triggered by pessimistic expectations. Likewise, more
optimistic expectations may induce the opposite behavior. This discussion provides some
clue why we do observe
Regularity 7: The possibility of two-sided contributions facilitates the emergence of
more diverse behavioral types, especially by making egoistic (or distrustful) and
efficiency-minded (or trustful) behavior more prominent.
In our view, the striking features of the two-sided as opposed to the one-sided gift
relationship, as stated by Regularities 6 and 7, are due to the fact that for mutual gifts
there is no purely distributional fairness constraint. All gift levels 1x , 2x  with
10,0 21 ≤≤ xx  can be justified as fair if the partner is expected to be either equally
generous or equally egoistic. In sum,
General conclusion 8: People engage in gift giving even when there is only one-sided
exchange and even when there are no efficiency gains. The level of giving is bounded
(from above) by fairness constraints in the sense that gifts do not put gift givers at a
disadvantage. Efficiency gains further gift giving when efficient outcomes are
expected. This leads to much more behavioral heterogeneity in two-sided than in one-
sided gift-relations.
5. Conclusions
Let us summarize the most relevant effects:
• Actual dictators never put themselves at a disadvantage, i.e. they always obey the
fairness constraints. They also expect others to do so. An increase of m from 1 to 2
induces lower sacrifices6 ( rr xx 21 > ) but larger gifts (
rr xx 21 2< ).
                                                          
6 A related observation has been made by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000b). They found that increasing
efficiency in an ultimatum game by multiplying the payoff of the proposer for each possible outcome by a
constant decreases the acceptance rate of a given offer. In other words, rejection rates are positively
correlated with the associated efficiency loss if fairness dictates so.
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• Hypothetical dictators are slightly less generous. This seems mainly due to their
pessimistic expectations concerning others’ generosity. The striking difference in
beliefs about others’ behavior speaks for role dependent expectations.
• In mutual gift giving the fairness constraint (that the level of gifts can be justified by
hopes which do not put the gift giver at a disadvantage) becomes non-binding. Every
choice is justifiable as fair, given ‘appropriate’ beliefs about the behavior of the
opponent. This reasonably explains the considerably larger heterogeneity of mutual
gifts.
• Only in the one-sided treatment, efficiency gains inspire larger gifts but reduce
sacrifices whereas in mutual gift giving also sacrifices increase with m ( rr xx 12 > ).
Our findings are in line with simple theories of fairness such as Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000a). However, if furthering efficiency is very cheap
two other studies found more evidence for efficiency considerations. Charness and Rabin
(2000) and Engelmann and Strobel (2000) found evidence that if furthering efficiency is
free of any monetary costs, some subjects choose efficient outcomes even if this puts the
individual so deciding at a disadvantage. Charness and Rabin (2000) in addition found
some evidence for efficiency considerations if the efficient choice is costly, but much
cheaper than in our experiment. The fact, however, that one rarely observes unconditional
cooperation in mutual gift giving games such as prisoner’ dilemma games and our
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Appendix
The following list presents first 24 independent observations for the two-sided treatment,
then the 24 choices of the X-participants, and finally the 24 choices of the Y-participants
in the one-sided treatment. After the participant number, a “1” in the second column
indicates that both control questions were answered correctly; “0” signals at least one
mistake. The third column gives the choice vectors ),( 21 xx , i.e. the gift 1x  in case of m =
1 and 2x  for m = 2, where the last 24 choice vectors (numbers 49 to 72) are, of course,
purely hypothetical. The final column lists the expectations concerning the average gift





1x 2x 1x 2x
Mutual gift giving
1 1 0,00 10,00 0,00 10,00
2 1 5,00 5,00 2,00 2,00
3 0 2,50 2,00 1,50 1,80
4 1 2,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
5 1 3,00 5,00 2,00 4,00
6 1 2,50 1,25 5,00 2,50
7 1 4,00 2,00 3,00 1,50
8 1 2,00 7,00 1,00 5,00
9 1 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
10 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
11 0 10,00 5,00 0,00 0,00
12 1 10,00 10,00 0,00 0,00
13 1 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00
14 1 0,00 0,00 2,00 1,00
15 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,00
16 1 2,00 2,00 1,00 1,00
17 0 5,00 3,00 5,00 1,00
18 1 6,00 4,00 3,00 2,00
19 1 4,00 8,00 4,00 4,00
20 1 4,00 9,00 5,00 10,00
21 1 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
22 1 0,00 0,00 0,50 1,00
23 1 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
24 1 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
Dictator giving
25 1 3,75 2,50 3,50 2,50
26 1 5,00 3,00 4,00 3,00
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27 1 2,50 1,50 1,50 0,50
28 1 2,00 2,00 2,00 1,00
29 1 2,50 2,50 4,00 4,00
30 1 2,00 2,00 4,00 3,00
31 1 5,00 2,50 4,00 2,00
32 1 4,00 3,00 3,00 2,00
33 1 1,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
34 1 2,00 1,00 4,00 2,00
35 1 2,00 1,00 4,00 2,00
36 1 5,00 2,50 5,00 2,50
37 0 10,00 5,00 10,00 5,00
38 1 2,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
39 1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
40 1 3,00 2,00 4,00 2,00
41 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
42 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
43 1 2,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
44 1 5,00 2,50 3,00 2,00
45 1 5,00 3,00 3,00 2,00
46 1 1,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
47 1 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
48 1 5,00 2,00 3,00 2,00
Recipients’ hypothetical givings
49 1 3,00 2,00 2,00 1,00
50 1 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
51 1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
52 1 5,00 3,00 1,00 1,00
53 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
54 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
55 1 10,00 10,00 0,25 0,25
56 1 4,00 2,00 4,00 2,00
57 1 2,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
58 1 2,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
59 1 2,00 1,00 2,00 2,00
60 1 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,00
61 1 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00
62 1 5,00 2,50 0,00 0,00
63 1 0,00 0,00 5,00 2,50
64 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
65 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
66 1 2,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
67 1 1,00 2,00 2,00 4,00
68 1 5,00 3,00 0,00 0,00
69 0 5,00 5,00 2,00 2,00
70 0 3,00 1,50 3,00 1,50
71 1 0,00 0,00 2,00 1,00
72 1 0,50 0,50 1,00 2,00
